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ABSTRACT
We study two different ways of forming multi-partner alliances between firms with the
central idea that procedure is an important factor in multi-partner alliance formation.
In the first procedure, an alliance is formed simultaneously, while in the second, step-
by-step procedure, members are added one by one. In the model we present, each firm
is assumed to have a multidimensional maneuvering space, which consists of all alliance
positions acceptable to the firm, and an ideal position in this space. Alliances will form
between the firms whose maneuvering spaces overlap. The results of the analysis confirm
that procedure is an important factor in multi-partner alliance formation. Nevertheless,
if ideal positions of firms are acceptable to all alliance partners, then the result of alliance
formation does not depend on procedure. In addition, it is shown that it can be disad-
vantageous to be a first mover. Finally, we are able to provide sufficient conditions under
which one procedure is preferred in a three-partner case. More specifically, a firm with its
ideal position acceptable to the two other firms may prefer the simultaneous procedure
to being a late mover if (1) there is a certain balance in the firms’ degree of flexibility and
their power and (2) if the agreed alliance position of the two other firms is acceptable to
the firm in question.
! This paper is published as De Ridder, Rusinowska (2008) On some procedures of forming a multi-partner
alliance, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 17(2): 443-487
21 INTRODUCTION
Formation of strategic alliances between firms has been a widely studied phenomenon
(e.g. Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001). Often, more than two firms form
an alliance and hence we speak of a multi-partner alliance or a consortium instead of
dyadic alliances. As Das and Teng (2002) point out, the formation and structure of such
multi-party alliances are more complex than just a summation of dyadic relations. In
real life, we find different kinds of multi-partner alliances. Within this variety of multi-
partner alliances, different ways of alliance formation are observable. Take for example the
One World Airline Alliance: after American Airlines, British Airways, Canadian Airlines,
Cathay Pacific, and Qantas formed the initial group in February 1999, Finair and Iberia
joined in September of that year. And only in June 2000, Aer Lingus and LAN Chile
were added (www.oneworldalliance.com). However, when the semiconductor industry in
the US bonded in SEMATECH, fourteen firms all together decided to form this alliance
and negotiated all together on the alliance (Browning, Beyer, and Shelter, 1995). A final
example is found in the mobile phone industry: the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) was
originated to achieve a certain standard (The WAP) to compete with American and
Asian standards. From four original founding members, Nokia, Ericsson, Motorola, and
Phone.com, this alliance evolved to an extensive group of firms supporting the standard
(www.openmobilealliance.org).
Roughly speaking, two different ways of multi-party alliance formation can be dis-
cerned: a simultaneous and a step-by-step procedure. The simultaneous approach to al-
liance formation implies negotiating immediately together with all the members of the
alliance. An alternative approach, the step-by-step procedure, means alliance formation
as a process in which the alliance group incrementally forms: new members are added
gradually. The distinction between these two procedures of alliance formation and its
consequences are the central subject of this article. Does it matter which procedure is
used if one compares the results of alliance formations and when is it advantageous for a
firm to join an alliance? To answer these questions we will work out the two procedures
in a formal spatial model. A multi-partner alliance is the term we will use to denote
any voluntary inter-organizational relationship between more than two firms in which
the firms remain independent. During the article, we will make the context of the model
more clear and show in what kind of business situations the model holds.
In short, the model deals with firms (the players), their alliance preferences (their po-
sition in Euclidean space), and compromising with partners (changing position in space).
A group of potential alliance members is placed in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space
in which the alliance preferences of the firms on different negotiation issues (dimensions)
form their positions. In the model, each firm has an ideal alliance position in a multidi-
3mensional Euclidean space, and around this position the firms have a certain flexibility in
negotiating which we will call a maneuvering space. All the positions in this maneuvering
space are acceptable to a firm. Firms’ preferences over all positions are defined according
to the rule: ‘The closer to my ideal position the better’. Multi-party alliances are formed
given the ideal alliance positions and the limits to the maneuvering spaces. To be able to
form an alliance, all the members have to agree on the negotiation issues at stake, and this
will result in one position in the space for that alliance. In this article, we formalize this
alliance formation process by determining the position of an alliance by its gravity center,
taking the weights of the firms in an alliance into account. We prove that the position
of an alliance belongs to the intersection of the maneuvering spaces of its members, and,
moreover, that the alliance position is Pareto efficient. To study the sequence of alliance
formation, we consider different ways of reaching this alliance position: a simultaneous
versus a step-by-step approach. We can prove that these two procedures lead to different
results, and we show that in three-partner cases it sometimes pays for a firm to enter an
alliance immediately, but sometimes a firm is better off entering the process later.
This article aims at contributing on two different fields. Our first contribution lies in
the field of strategic alliance research. Although the formation of multi-partner alliances
has been studied in alliance research (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Doz, Olk, and Smith Ring, 2000),
the behavioral negotiations of alliance formation has - with some exceptions - remained
understudied (Rao and Schmidt, 1998), let alone the lack of attention for the sequence of
alliance formation. As seen above however, in real life, different ways of alliance formation
are found. Here, we want to lay bare these differences in forming a multi-partner alliance
and study the effects. We have chosen for a formal approach to shed light on these dif-
ferences. Next to the virtues of such an approach, a more formal approach to alliance
formation has so far lacked the field (some exceptions can be found in Parkhe, 1993; Ax-
elrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and Bruderer, 1995; and Park and Zhou, 2005). With
our model, we aim at presenting a new and more formal vision on alliance formation. To
explicitly show the use of such a formal model in the field of alliances we will extensively
discuss its interpretations in section 2.1.
Second, we want to make a contribution in the field of coalition formation mod-
els, and more specific spatial coalition modelling (e.g. Grofman, 1982; Schofield, 1993;
De Vries, 1999). Spatial models (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958; Enelow and Hinich, 1984;
Hinich and Munger, 1994) use spatial analysis to forecast coalitions, with the central
idea of ‘cooperating with your closest neighbor’. Such models have mainly been applied
to coalition formation in politics (Martin and Stevenson, 2001). These spatial coalition
formation theories have so far for the most part lacked two dynamic aspects: changes
of positions of players during the game and a lack of attention for different procedures.
Players are usually assumed to have a fixed position which does not change during the
4coalition formation game. Also, spatial coalition theories often neglect the procedure of
forming a coalition (c.f. Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2005; Bloch, 1996). In this paper, we
will work on both assumptions: we will assume players can change their position during
negotiations and we will take different procedures of forming an alliance into account.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1, we introduce the main ideas of the
model and its interpretation in the field of alliances. In section 2.2, we present definitions
of the notions of gravity center and of Pareto efficiency. Section 3 concerns the simul-
taneous procedure and in section 4 we describe the step-by-step procedure. Those two
different procedures are illustrated and compared in a numerical example presented in
section 5. In section 6, we compare the procedures. We deliver sufficient conditions under
which the procedures are equally attractive to a firm, and sufficient conditions under
which one procedure is more attractive to a firm than another one. After the conclusions
in section 7, the mathematical definitions and theorems needed for proving our results
are stated in Appendix A, while the proofs themselves are presented in Appendix B.
2 SPATIAL MODEL OF ALLIANCE FORMATION
2.1 The model and its interpretations
In this section, we introduce the main concepts of our theory of alliance formation and its
interpretation. Some ideas presented here are a formalized version of the spatial model
of coalition formation introduced in De Ridder and Van Deemen (2004).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players, here firms, which all want to form a coalition,
or in this interpretation an alliance. Each firm i has a weight wi > 0, where i ∈ N . One
may think of the weight as a representation of the size of a firm by (a combination of)
its returns, profit, or number of employees. An alternative interpretation of the weight
could be the amount of bargaining power a firm has in the alliance (Yan and Gray, 1994).
An xi is a position of a player in a multidimensional Euclidean space Rm, m ≥ 1. It is
assumed that each firm i ∈ N chooses an ideal position x∗i in this space.
In general, the ideal position of a firm refers to the most favorite position of a firm
concerning the issues (i.e. dimensions) which have to be agreed on when forming an
alliance. Relevant issues are not issues related to the raison-d’eˆtre of an alliance, but
issues concerning the terms and conditions of the alliance which have to be settled by
agreement (Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, and Looise, 2000; Parkhe, 1991). Irrespective
of the branch or the aim of an alliance, every alliance has to agree on these terms and
specifications. Hence, the model in principle applies to every alliance. However, what the
relevant issues are is of course different for each (kind of) alliance. Moreover, it is also
5context specific how many issues have to be settled, and hence how many dimensions play
a role. Three general motives can be found in the literature to set up an alliance: to gain
economies of scale, to gain access to particular resources, and collective lobbying (e.g.
standard setting alliances) (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001). Let us discuss
per kind of alliance what an alliance position could imply.
Alliances that form due to economies of scale anticipate on efficiency advantages.
Examples of such alliances are airline alliances (see the Introduction) and alliances in the
health care sector. In the latter, the location of a new hospital might be an important
issue. In airline alliances, think of the amount of planes each company provides, the
amount of flight routes maintained in the alliance, and the exact combination of the air
miles programme.
Access to resources is a very general motive for alliance formation. Resources can
refer to tangible resources as money, buildings, machinery, but resources also include
technology, market access, and capabilities. In this category, we find co-development
alliances; firms complement each others resource profile so that new products or services
can be developed. The alliance between IBM, Intel, and Microsoft set up to produce a
computer in order to compete with Apple is an example of a co-development alliance.
In such alliance producing goods or services together, the following issues can play a
role: cultural and management issues (individualism versus collectivism, confrontation
versus harmony style (Douma et al., 2000; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, and Aulakh,
2001; Parkhe 1991)), marketing issues (amount of countries selling the product, amount
of products developed together), and the set up of an alliance (kind of contract, relation
with other brands, intended duration of alliance).
Finally, lobbying together includes for example setting a standard with alliance part-
ners. The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) from the introduction is such a standard setting
alliance, but also think of a standard for recording a DVD. Especially in the early phase
of such an alliance, partners have to negotiate on technical specifications in which each
member has its own wishes given in by the technical expertise the firm has. In setting
a standard for recording a DVD, technical issues concern the thickness of the laser, the
angle of the laser, or the amount of gig. Non-technical disputes can be the amount of
openness of the alliance (access for new members), the distribution of digital rights, or
the communication style.
If all firms in the game have an ideal position, we can calculate a distance between
each two positions xi = (xi1, ..., xim) and xj = (xj1, ..., xjm), which is given by
d(xi, xj) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
(xik − xjk)2. (1)
6Firms have their preferences defined in Rm. Each firm i ∈ N is assumed to have a
complete, transitive, and reflexive preference relation $i over Rm; the strict preference
relation %i, which is irreflexive and transitive, and the indifference preference relation ∼i,
which is an equivalence relation, are defined in the standard way. The closer a position
is to the ideal position of a firm, the better.
We assume that a firm is not willing to deviate too much from its ideal position. Each
firm has a certain amount of flexibility on the negotiation issues and we formalize this
with a maneuvering space Mi ⊂ Rm which consists of all alliance positions acceptable to
firm i. For each i ∈ N , we assume
∀i ∈ N ∀y, z ∈ Rm [y $i z ⇔ d(x∗i , y) ≤ d(x∗i , z)], (2)
and, of course
∀i ∈ N ∀y, z ∈ Rm [y %i z ⇔ d(x∗i , y) < d(x∗i , z)], (3)
∀i ∈ N ∀y, z ∈ Rm [y ∼i z ⇔ d(x∗i , y) = d(x∗i , z)]. (4)
We assume the maneuvering space to be a ball in Rm, that is,
Mi = {y ∈ Rm | d(x∗i , y) ≤ ri}, (5)
where ri is called the radius of the maneuvering space of firm i. The radius represents
the size of the maneuvering space of a firm; in other words it indicates how flexible a
firm is in negotiations. In the remainder of the paper we will use the notation Mi for the
maneuvering space of firm i with middle point x∗i and radius ri.
Given the ideal positions x∗i with i ∈ S, all the firms of the potential alliance S choose
a position for that alliance S, called the alliance position and denoted as xS. The alliance
position is a formalization of the compromise which is reached between all the members
of the alliance concerning the issues that have to be settled. In line with the idea of the
maneuvering space, firm i will never agree on a position which does not belong toMi. The
positions that are outside the maneuvering space of the firm are unacceptable to the firm
and hence a firm will never compromise outside its acceptable positions. Consequently,
an alliance S has a chance to be formed if and only if⋂
i∈S
Mi += ∅. (6)
Moreover, of course,
xS ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi. (7)
7To sum up, we have the following ingredients in our model. A set of players, firms,
which will form coalitions, alliances. Each firm has an ideal position in a multidimensional
Euclidean space representing a firm’s standpoint on the issues that have to be settled in
the alliance. Furthermore, each firm has a spatial flexibility to negotiate (its maneuvering
space). Alliances will only form between those firms whose maneuvering spaces overlap.
If so, an alliance position will be decided on.
2.2 Definitions
Before we add different procedures of forming an alliance to the model introduced in
section 2.1, we present here the definitions of a Gravity center and of Pareto efficiency,
which we will use in the remainder of the paper.
To determine the positions of an alliance which is formed by one of the procedures we
describe in this paper, we need the notion of a gravity center. In general, a gravity center
is a weighted average of several positions. If firms form an alliance and have different
ideal positions, the alliance position they will agree on will be dependent on their ideal
positions and weights. The more weight a firm has relative to the others, the more this
firm can ‘pull’ the alliance position to its own ideal position. The final alliance position
will be somewhere in between all ideal positions, closest to the firm with the most weight
and farthest to the smallest firm. The formal definition of the notion of gravity center is
the following:
Definition 1 (Gravity center)
The coordinates of the gravity center xG = (xG1 , ..., x
G
m) of a set of n alliance positions
xi = (xi1, ..., xim) in Rm, i = 1, ..., n, with weights w1, ..., wn, where xi and wi denote the
position and the weight of firm i, respectively, are given by the following formula
xGp =
∑n
i=1wi · xip∑n
i=1wi
for p = 1, ...,m. (8)
Furthermore, we are interested in the alliance positions (belonging to the intersection
of the maneuvering spaces) which are Pareto efficient. A position is Pareto efficient with
respect to an alliance if there is no other position in the overlap of the alliance members’
maneuvering spaces that is more preferred by all members of the alliance. The notion of
Pareto efficiency is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Pareto Efficiency)
Let S ⊆ N and Mi = Mi(x∗i , ri) for i ∈ S be such that
⋂
i∈S Mi += ∅. An alliance position
8y ∈ ⋂i∈S Mi is Pareto efficient with respect to alliance S if
¬ ∃z ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi ∀k ∈ S [z %k y], (9)
or equivalently,
∀z ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi ∃k ∈ S [d(x∗k, y) ≤ d(x∗k, z)]. (10)
3 FORMING AN ALLIANCE SIMULTANEOUSLY
To find a solution to our basic alliance formation model, we will consider and compare two
procedures: a simultaneous procedure and a step-by-step procedure. In both procedures
we assume that the maneuvering spaces of all members of the envisaged alliance overlap.
With this comparison we hope to shed some light on the problem underlying this article:
does it matter for firms how they organize alliance negotiations, and if so which strategy is
most advantageous to a firm? In this section, we study a non-hierarchial approach which
considers alliance formation as a one-step procedure. In this simultaneous procedure there
are no pre-alliances which form intermediate steps before a definitive coalition is reached:
all the firms of an alliance sit round the table to negotiate simultaneously. The formal
description of the simultaneous procedure looks as follows.
Procedure S
Let S ⊆ N and Mi = Mi(x∗i , ri), for i ∈ S, be maneuvering spaces in Rm such that⋂
i∈S Mi += ∅.
– First, each firm i ∈ S chooses the position x˜Si such that
x˜Si = (x˜
S
i1, ..., x˜
S
im) = arg min
y∈⋂j∈S Mj d(x
∗
i , y) for i ∈ S. (11)
– Next, the position xS = (xS1, ..., xSm) for the alliance S is chosen as the gravity
center of the set of positions x˜Si defined in (11) with weights wi, for i ∈ S, that is,
xS = (xS1, ..., xSm) is defined by:
xSp =
∑
i∈S wi · x˜Sip∑
i∈S wi
for p = 1, ...,m. (12)
9In the simultaneous procedure, denoted above as Procedure S, each member i of the
alliance S first chooses a position x˜Si in the intersection of the maneuvering spaces of
all firms of S such that the distance of this position to the ideal point of i is minimal.
Such a position x˜Si is called the negotiation position of party i and is defined by equation
(11). The negotiation position is an intermediate step between a firm’s ideal position
and the alliance position. The choice of the negotiation positions means that on the
one hand the firms express their readiness to form the alliance by taking a position in
the intersection, but on the other hand, they like to stay as close as possible to their
ideal position. Next, the firms decide together about the position of the alliance. Here
the weights of the firms play a role, since the alliance position xS is the gravity center
of the set of the negotiation positions; see equation (12). So, a weighted average of the
negotiation positions determines which position the alliance will take.
As a first finding, Proposition 1 describes some properties of xS:
Proposition 1 Let xS be the position of the alliance S defined in (12). Then:
(a) xS ∈
⋂
i∈S Mi,
(b) xS is Pareto efficient with respect to alliance S.
The first part of Proposition 1 confirms that the alliance position is in the overlap of
all firms’ maneuvering spaces, that is, the alliance position chosen by the simultaneous
procedure is always acceptable by each member of the alliance. The second part says that
there is no other position that is more preferred by all members of the alliance.
Secondly, we can prove that the simultaneous procedure is uniquely defined as it always
leads to exactly one alliance position, i.e.,
Proposition 2 Let S ⊆ N and Mi = Mi(x∗i , ri), for i ∈ S, be maneuvering spaces in
Rm such that
⋂
i∈S Mi += ∅. For each i ∈ S, there is always exactly one x˜Si ∈ Rm satisfying
(11). Consequently, Procedure S is uniquely defined, that is, there is always exactly one
position xS for the alliance S defined in (12).
Hence, the defined procedure leads to a unique alliance position, which is acceptable
for all alliance members and is Pareto efficient.
4 FORMING AN ALLIANCE STEP-BY-STEP
Instead of negotiating with all members of an alliance simultaneously, firms can also form
an alliance step-by-step. The step-by-step procedure is an incremental and hierarchical
approach which sees ‘ ... coalition building as a process in which actors with similar
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... preferences first get together in some sort of provisional alliance and, only after this
has been done ..., do they cast around for other coalition partners, adding these until
the formation criterion is satisfied’ (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 140). The proto-coalition
model of Grofman (1982) is such a hierarchial model, and Seidman and Winter (1998) also
present a gradual coalition formation model. In this section, we present the step-by-step
procedure for forming an alliance with an arbitrary number of firms whose maneuvering
spaces overlap. The provisional alliance which is used during negotiations will be denoted
here with pre-alliance.
First of all, note that for each alliance S ⊆ N , there are |S|!2 possible step-by-step
procedures for forming an alliance. Each step-by-step procedure will be denoted by the
order in which firms form an alliance. For instance, Procedure {{i, j}, k} means that first
firms i and j form a pre-alliance {i, j}, and next firm k joins this alliance. In general, by
S we will denote an order in which firms form an alliance S, that is
S = {{...{{i1, i2}, i3}...}, i|S|}, (13)
where S = {i1, ..., i|S|} and |S| ≥ 3. Moreover, let
Sp = {i1, ..., ip} (14)
for 3 ≤ p ≤ |S|, and let Sp denote an order in which the first p firms form an alliance Sp,
that is,
Sp = {{...{{i1, i2}, i3}...}, ip}. (15)
Let PROC(S) denote the set of all possible step-by-step procedures of forming alliance
S. For instance, in case of a three-partner alliance, three step-by-step procedures are
possible: k,j, and i joining as last members. Formally,
PROC({i, j, k}) = {{{i, j}, k}, {{i, k}, j}, {{j, k}, i}}.
Hence, as already mentioned, for each alliance S,
|PROC(S)| = |S|!
2
.
Finally, xS denotes the position of alliance S resulting from using Procedure S ∈ PROC(S),
and xSp denotes the position of alliance Sp = {i1, ..., ip} resulting from using Procedure
Sp. We propose the following step-by-step procedure for forming an alliance S:
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Procedure S
Let S ⊆ N and Mi = Mi(x∗i , ri), for i ∈ S, be maneuvering spaces in Rm such that⋂
i∈S Mi += ∅. Let S = {i1, ..., i|S|}, |S| ≥ 3, and let S be an order in which firms form
an alliance S, as defined in (13). Let Sp be an order in which the first p firms form an
alliance Sp, 3 ≤ p ≤ |S|, as defined in (15).
The firms i1, ..., i|S| form the alliance S as follows:
– First, firms i1 and i2 choose x˜
{i1,i2}
i1 and x˜
{i1,i2}
i2 defined as follows:
x˜{i1,i2}i1 = (x˜
{i1,i2}
i11 , ..., x˜
{i1,i2}
i1m ) = arg minz∈Mi1∩Mi2
d(x∗i1 , z), (16)
x˜{i1,i2}i2 = (x˜
{i1,i2}
i21 , ..., x˜
{i1,i2}
i2m ) = arg minz∈Mi1∩Mi2
d(x∗i2 , z). (17)
– Firms i1 and i2 form a pre-alliance {i1, i2} and choose the position x{i1,i2} for the
pre-alliance {i1, i2}. The position x{i1,i2} is the gravity center of x˜{i1,i2}i1 and x˜{i1,i2}i2 ,
with weights wi1 and wi2. That makes:
x{i1,i2}l =
wi1 · x˜{i1,i2}i1l + wi2 · x˜{i1,i2}i2l
wi1 + wi2
for l = 1, ...,m. (18)
– Next, firm i3 joins the pre-alliance {i1, i2}, and it chooses the position x˜{i1,i2,i3}i3 ∈ Rm
such that
x˜{i1,i2,i3}i3 = (x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i31 , ..., x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3m ) = arg minz∈Mi1∩Mi2∩Mi3
d(x∗i3 , z). (19)
– The pre-alliance {i1, i2} chooses a new position x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} = (x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
{i1,i2}1 , ..., x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
{i1,i2}m ) ∈
Rm such that
x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} = (x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
{i1,i2}1 , ..., x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
{i1,i2}m ) = arg minz∈Mi1∩Mi2∩Mi3
d(x{i1,i2}, z). (20)
– Firms i1, i2, and i3 choose the position x{{i1,i2},i3} = (x{{i1,i2},i3}1, ..., x{{i1,i2},i3}m) ∈ Rm
for the pre-alliance {i1, i2, i3} such that
x{{i1,i2},i3}l =
(wi1 + wi2) · x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2}l + wi3 · x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
for l = 1, ...,m. (21)
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– If |S| > 3, then starting from p = 3 to p = |S|− 1 we repeat the following:
• Firm ip+1 chooses the position x˜Sp∪{ip+1}ip+1 ∈ Rm such that
x˜
Sp∪{ip+1}
ip+1 = arg minz∈⋂i∈{i1,...,ip+1}Mi d(x
∗
ip+1 , z). (22)
• Pre-alliance Sp chooses a new position x˜Sp∪{ip+1}Sp ∈ Rm such that
x˜
Sp∪{ip+1}
Sp
= arg min
z∈⋂i∈{i1,...,ip+1}Mi d(xSp , z). (23)
• Firm ip+1 joins the pre-alliance {i1, ..., ip}, and firms i1, ..., ip+1 choose the position
x{Sp,ip+1} = (x{Sp,ip+1}1, ..., x{Sp,ip+1}m) for the alliance {i1, ..., ip+1} such that, for
each l = 1, ...,m
x{Sp,ip+1}l =
x˜
Sp∪{ip+1}
Spl
·∑pr=1wir + x˜Sp∪{ip+1}ip+1l · wip+1∑p+1
r=1 wir
. (24)
Let us analyze the step-by-step procedure. First, a two-firm pre-alliance {i1, i2} is formed.
Firms i1 and i2 choose their negotiation positions x˜
{i1,i2}
i1 and x˜
{i1,i2}
i2 from the intersection
of their maneuvering spaces; see equations (16) and (17). These negotiation positions
minimize the distances between the ideal positions of the firms in question and the overlap
of their maneuvering spaces. Next, the pre-alliance position x{i1,i2} is chosen which is the
gravity center of the negotiation positions; see equation (18). So far, this coincides with
the simultaneous procedure, but note the difference when a third party joins. In that case,
this third firm i3 chooses its negotiation position x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3 which minimizes the distance
between its ideal position and the overlap of the three firms’ maneuvering spaces; see
(19). Moreover, the pre-alliance {i1, i2} chooses a new position x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} which minimizes
a distance between the pre-alliance position x{i1,i2} and the overlap of the maneuvering
spaces of all three firms; see (20). In contrast to the simultaneous procedure, the pre-
alliance takes the agreed pre-alliance position as ideal position. Finally, firms i1, i2, i3
choose the alliance position x{{i1,i2},i3} as the gravity center of the negotiation positions
of the old alliance {i1, i2} (x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} ) and the firm i3 (x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3 ), with the weights wi1+wi2
and w3, respectively; see (21). If there are more firms interested in joining, the procedure
continues in an analogous way. The underlying idea is always the same: a new firm
and the pre-alliance choose their negotiation positions. The negotiation position of the
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new firm minimizes the distance between its ideal position and the overlap of all firms
in question (see (22)), while the negotiation position of the pre-alliance minimizes the
distance between the position of this alliance and the overlap of all firms involved; see (23).
As defined by (24), the alliance position is always the gravity center of the negotiation
positions of the new firm and the pre-alliance. The weight of the pre-alliance is equal to
the sum of the weights of the pre-alliance members.
As in the simultaneous case, we can prove that the step-by-step procedure leads to
an alliance position in the overlap of all maneuvering spaces which is acceptable to all
firms in the alliance, and this alliance position is Pareto efficient. Formally:
Proposition 3 Let xS be the position of alliance S resulting from Procedure S (see (22),
(23) and (24)), where S ∈ PROC(S). Then:
(a) xS ∈
⋂
i∈S Mi,
(b) xS is Pareto efficient with respect to alliance S.
Secondly, one may show that the step-by-step procedure leads to a unique prediction;
it will lead to one alliance position.
Proposition 4 Let S ⊆ N and ⋂i∈S Mi += ∅. Procedure S, where S ∈ PROC(S), is
uniquely defined, that is, there is always exactly one position xS defined in (24).
In order to make the procedure more specific and show how calculations may be made,
we will consider more in detail a two- and three-partner alliance formed with the step-by-
step procedure. By virtue of Propositions 3 and 4, unique and Pareto efficient predictions
will be made. In the case of a two-partner alliance formation, it is easy to calculate the
negotiation positions.
Proposition 5 Let Mi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1) and Mi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2) be two maneuvering
spaces in Rm such that Mi1∩Mi2 += ∅. There is always exactly one x˜{i1,i2}i1 ∈ Rm satisfying
(16) and it looks as follows:
– If ri2 ≥ d(x∗i1 , x∗i2), then x˜{i1,i2}i1 = x∗i1,
– if ri2 < d(x
∗
i1 , x
∗
i2), then x˜
{i1,i2}
i1 is equal to
x˜{i1,i2}i1p = x
∗
i2p +
ri2 · (x∗i1p − x∗i2p)√∑m
r=1(x
∗
i1r − x∗i2r)2
= x∗i2p +
ri2 · (x∗i1p − x∗i2p)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
for p = 1, ...,m.
(25)
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Proposition 5 gives two scenarios. First, if the ideal point of firm i1 belongs to the ma-
neuvering space of i2, then the negotiation position of i1 (when forming the pre-alliance
{i1, i2}) coincides with its ideal point. In the second scenario, the ideal point of firm i1 lies
outside the maneuvering space of i2 and in that case equation (25) gives the negotiation
position of i1.
Proposition 6 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a Pareto efficient position
in a two-partner pre-alliance: the set of all Pareto efficient positions with respect to the
alliance is the segment between the negotiation positions of the firms involved.
Proposition 6 Let Mi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1) and Mi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2) be two maneuvering
spaces in Rm such that Mi1 ∩Mi2 += ∅. A position y ∈Mi1 ∩Mi2 is Pareto efficient with
respect to {i1, i2} if and only if y ∈ x˜{i1,i2}i1 x˜{i1,i2}i2 , where x˜{i1,i2}i1 and x˜{i1,i2}i2 are defined
in (16) and (17), respectively, and x˜{i1,i2}i1 x˜
{i1,i2}
i2 denotes the segment between x˜
{i1,i2}
i1 and
x˜{i1,i2}i2 .
One can also calculate the negotiation position of a three-partner alliance.
Proposition 7 Let Mi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1), Mi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2), and Mi3 = Mi3(x
∗
i3 , ri3) be
three maneuvering spaces in Rm such that Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 += ∅. There is always exactly
one x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} ∈ Rm satisfying (20) and it looks as follows:
– If ri3 ≥ d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}), then x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} = x{i1,i2},
– if ri3 < d(x
∗
i3 , x{i1,i2}), then x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
{i1,i2} is equal to
x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2}p = x
∗
i3p +
ri3 · (x{i1,i2}p − x∗i3p)
d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2})
for p = 1, ...,m. (26)
Again, two scenarios are discussed in Proposition 7. If the position of pre-alliance {i1, i2}
belongs to the maneuvering space of a new joining firm i3, then the negotiation position
of {i1, i2} (when forming a three-partner alliance) coincides with the pre-alliance position
x{i1,i2} resulted from the pre-alliance formation. However, if the alliance position x{i1,i2}
lies outside the maneuvering space of firm i3, equation (26) holds.
5 A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we introduce a very simple numerical three-partner, two-dimensional ex-
ample. From now on, we will often make use of three-partner alliances in our analyses.
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The reason for that is twofold. First, analysis with more than three partners are theo-
retically complex. Second, three-partner alliances are formed more frequently in reality
and larger multi-partner alliances fail more often (Parkhe, 1993). Hence, the relevance of
three-partner alliances is larger.
This example illustrates all the procedures mentioned before and shows how these
procedures can lead to different outcomes. The valuation of these outcomes by the firms in
the game gives us the opportunity to compare these outcomes, and hence the procedures.
Let us consider three firms, N = {i, j, k}. Let the ideal alliance positions perceived
by the parties be equal to x∗i = (−3, 1), x∗j = (3, 1), x∗k = (0,−3). Here, it is seen we work
with two dimensions. Recall from Section 2.1 what these dimensions, and hence positions
mean; issues to be agreed on. Furthermore, let the radii of the maneuvering spaces of
the firms be ri = rj = rk = 4. This means that all three firms are equally flexible and
what to deviate to the same extent from their ideal alliance position. The weights of the
parties are equal to wi = 5, wj = 3, wk = 2. Firm i is the most powerful player, while
firm k has the least power in the negotiations. From (1), we can calculate the distances
between firms’ ideal positions: d(x∗i , x
∗
j) = 6, d(x
∗
i , x
∗
k) = d(x
∗
j , x
∗
k) = 5. Moreover, we
have seen that we need to calculate negotiation positions x˜ as the intermediate step
in the negotiations between ideal positions and alliance positions. For the step-by-step
pre-alliances these are x˜{i,j}i = (−1, 1), x˜{i,j}j = (1, 1). By virtue of (18), we get
x{i,j} =
(
−1
4
, 1
)
, x{i,k} =
(
−66
35
,−17
35
)
, x{j,k} =
(
42
25
,−19
25
)
.
In order to find the positions of the multi-partner alliance
{i, j, k}
resulting from different procedures, we will have to solve several systems of equations
and inequalities. For instance, in order to find x˜{i,j,k}i we solve the following system of
equations and inequality 
(x˜{i,j,k}i1 − 3)2 + (x˜{i,j,k}i2 − 1)2 = 16
(x˜{i,j,k}i1 )
2 + (x˜{i,j,k}i2 + 3)
2 = 16
(x˜{i,j,k}i1 + 3)
2 + (x˜{i,j,k}i2 − 1)2 ≤ 16
and get
x˜{i,j,k}i =
(
3
2
− 2
√
39
5
,−1 + 3
√
39
10
)
.
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By analogy, we calculate
x˜{i,j,k}j =
(
2
√
39
5
− 3
2
,−1 + 3
√
39
10
)
, x˜{i,j,k}k =
(
0, 1−√7
)
.
In order to find x˜{i,j,k}{i,j} we solve the following system of equations
(x˜{i,j,k}{i,j}1 )
2 + (x˜{i,j,k}{i,j}2 + 3)
2 = 16
x˜{i,j,k}{i,j}1 = t · x{i,j}1 + (1− t) · x∗k1
x˜{i,j,k}{i,j}2 = t · x{i,j}2 + (1− t) · x∗k2 for t ∈ [0, 1]
(27)
and get
x˜{i,j,k}{i,j} =
(
− 4√
257
,
64√
257
− 3
)
.
In an analogous way, we get
x˜{i,j,k}{i,k} =
(
3− 684√
31945
, 1− 208√
31945
)
, x˜{i,j,k}{j,k} =
(
93
125
,− 51
125
)
.
By virtue of (21) and the data above, we have
x{{i,j},k} =
(
− 16
5
√
257
,
256
5
√
257
− 11
5
−
√
7
5
)
(28)
x{{i,k},j} =
(
33
20
− 2394
5
√
31945
+
3
√
39
25
,
2
5
− 728
5
√
31945
+
9
√
39
100
)
(29)
x{{j,k},i} =
(
561
500
−
√
39
5
,− 88
125
+
3
√
39
20
)
. (30)
Finally, by virtue of (12) and the data above, we get
x{i,j,k} =
(
3
10
− 2
√
39
25
,−3
5
+
6
√
39
25
−
√
7
5
)
. (31)
Next, to determine each firm’s preferences we calculate the distance between its ideal
alliance position and the different positions of the multi-partner alliance resulting from
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the different procedures. To be complete, we also take the pre-alliances which form during
the step-by-step procedure into account. For firm i, this means comparing x∗i with the
position of the simultaneously formed {i, j, k} (see (31)) the three step-by-step alliances
(see (28), (29), and (30)), and the two-partner pre-alliances i is part of. The same kind of
comparisons are made for the other two firms. Based on these calculations, we create a
ranking of (pre-)alliance positions for each firm. Figure 1 shows the results. Here, we can
for example see that firm i prefers the two-partner pre-alliance with k ({i, k}) the most,
and that joining {j, k} later in the step-by-step procedure is its least favorite option.
Figure 1: Ranking of (pre-)alliances’ positions
firm preferences
i x{i,k} %i x{i,j} %i x{{i,k},j} %i x{{i,j},k} %i x{i,j,k} %i x{{j,k},i}
j x{j,k} %j x{{j,k},i} %j x{{i,j},k} %j x{i,j} %j x{i,j,k} %j x{{i,k},j}
k x{j,k} %k x{i,k} %k x{{i,k},j} %k x{{j,k},i} %k x{i,j,k} %k x{{i,j},k}
Based on this example, several implications can be stated. First, the example shows
that different procedures yield different outcomes - alliance positions. Hence, when nego-
tiating on an alliance position, the kind of procedure adopted matters. It is also seen that
firms have different preferences over the different procedures. Recall that preference is
determined by distance: the closer an alliance position to a firm’s ideal position, the bet-
ter. Since the distances between the different alliance positions and a firm’s ideal position
differ, the preferences over the outcomes and the procedures differ.
Second, in this example, we can draw some general conclusions for all three firms
concerning their preferences over the procedures. There are three paths to reach the
three-partner alliance: in a simultaneous way, step-by-step joining in the first round
(first-mover), and step-by-step joining in the last round (late-mover). In this example, it
happens that the preferences of all three firms over these three paths is the same. They
prefer being a first mover the most. Second best is the simultaneous procedure, while the
least preferred situation is the step-by-step alliance in which the specific firm joins as
the last member. Disliking being a last-mover (for i this is {{j, k}, i}) can be explained
by the fact that not only the ideal position of a firm (x∗i ) is not acceptable by the other
firms (j and k), but also the two-partner pre-alliance position (x{j,k}) is not acceptable
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to the remaining third firm (i). This is why a firm is better off if it joins already in the
beginning, either as one of the first movers or in the simultaneous procedure.
Third, in addition to distance to ideal positions, negotiation power plays a role in
the model. In the example, the firms have different negotiating power: firm i is the most
powerful one, while firm k is the least powerful. The role of negotiation power is for
example seen in the attractiveness of firm k for both firm i and j: both firms i and j
prefer to join first with the least powerful and ‘closer’ firm k. This is not only because
firm k’s ideal position is closer to i (and j) than the ideal position of j (and of i), but
also because k has the smallest negotiating power. In general, in the example, we can see
that for each firm, forming a two-partner pre-alliance with the less powerful and ‘closer’
of the remaining two firms is the most attractive option.
The question is whether the implications hold in all cases or are characteristic for this
example. In the next section, we will check if these results hold in general or are just
accidental.
6 COMPARING THE PROCEDURES
So far, we have shown the formalization of two procedures of alliance formation. In the
previous section, we saw that these procedures indeed lead to different solutions, and that
firms have clear preferences over these solutions. We will now investigate issues related
to the role of procedure and try to find out whether the preference sequence from the
example always hold. Three question are tackled: when does procedure not matter, is
being a first mover always advantageous, and when is one procedure more advantageous?
In order to answer those questions, we will provide some general results which hold for
n players and m dimensions and be more specific and intuitive with three-partner m-
dimensional specifications and examples.
6.1 When does procedure not matter?
In the presented example, the different procedures have all led to different results. A
follow-up question would be to ask whether the procedures always lead to different alliance
positions. In which case will an alliance formed by the simultaneous procedure lead to the
same position as this alliance formed step-by-step? In Proposition 8, we deliver sufficient
conditions under which the procedures of forming an n-partner alliance (n ≥ 3) are
equally attractive to a firm.
Proposition 8 Let Mi for i ∈ N be maneuvering spaces in Rm,
S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, i˜ ∈ N \ S.
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(1) If
⋂
j∈S Mj += ∅ and for each i ∈ S, x∗i ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, then
xS = xS for each S ∈ PROC(S). (32)
(2) If
⋂
j∈S∪{˜i}Mj += ∅ and for each i ∈ S, x∗i ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, then
x{S,˜i} = x{S,˜i} for any S, S ∈ PROC(S). (33)
(3) If
⋂
j∈S∪{˜i}Mj += ∅ and for each i ∈ S, x∗i ∈
⋂
j∈S∪{˜i}Mj, then
x{S,˜i} = xS∪{˜i} for each S ∈ PROC(S). (34)
What does Proposition 8 say? According to part (1), if the ideal positions of all com-
panies forming an alliance S belong to the (non-empty) intersection of the maneuvering
spaces of the companies in question, then the simultaneous procedure and all step-by-
step procedures of forming the alliance S do lead to the same alliance position. Parts (2)
and (3) concern a situation in which a new firm i˜ joins the alliance S, and therefore we
assume that the intersection of the maneuvering spaces of the companies forming S ∪ {˜i}
is non-empty. Part (2) says that if the ideal positions of all members of S belong to
the (non-empty) intersection of the maneuvering spaces of the companies of S, then all
step-by-step procedures of forming S ∪ {˜i} in which the firm i˜ is the last mover also lead
to the same alliance position. The final part (3) states that if the ideal positions of all
members of S belong to the (non-empty) intersection of the maneuvering spaces of the
companies of S ∪ {˜i}, then all step-by-step procedures of forming S ∪ {˜i} in which the
firm i˜ is the last mover and the simultaneous procedure of forming S ∪ {˜i} give the same
alliance position.
In other words, to put it very simply and general: if ideal alliance positions of firms
(either all firms forming an alliance or all first-movers) are acceptable to all firms, then
procedure plays no role (either all procedures or certain step-by-step procedures). This
very general finding can be fine-tuned according to the three sufficient conditions we have
found in Proposition 8 (part (1), (2), and (3)). While the first part studies acceptability
of all members of an alliance, the second and third part consider acceptability between
first movers.
First, if the ideal alliance positions of the members of an alliance are already acceptable
by all members of the alliance, then procedure plays no role (part (1)). That means
that either the ideal positions themselves are really close and acceptable by the alliance
members or the firms are very flexible such that they also find a distant ideal position
of another firm still acceptable. The firms already agree to such an extent, that neither
negotiations nor negotiation procedures are that important anymore.
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Second, we can relax this rather strict condition and consider a situation in which
firms with their ideal positions acceptable by all (pre-)alliance members (as in (1)) have
already formed a pre- alliance with the step-by-step procedure and are now joined by
an ‘outlier’ (part (2)). The joining firm is an outlier as its ideal position may be outside
the overlap of the other firms’ maneuvering spaces. This means that the ideal alliance
position of the joining firm may be not acceptable by (some of) the members of the
pre-alliance. However, this does not mean that all of the positions acceptable for the firm
joining last are unacceptable to the members of the pre-alliance. As in all (pre-)alliances
we study, all firms involved have a non-empty intersection of their maneuvering space,
that is, an agreement is possible: there is an alliance position which is acceptable to all
firms involved. In the situation in which the ideal alliance positions of all firms, except
of the last mover, are acceptable by all members of the alliance, then all the step-by-step
procedures with the outlier as last mover lead to the same outcome.
Third, if, additionally, the ideal alliance positions of all alliance members are accept-
able to the last mover, then all the step-by-step procedures with this last mover and the
simultaneous procedure lead to the same result (part (3)).
As one can see, the found conditions under which procedure plays no role do not
depend on the negotiating power of the firms involved. The only important element here
is whether the alliance members can already accept the ideal alliance positions of either
all the members or only of the first-movers. This acceptability depends on the relation
between the ideal positions of the firms and the flexibility of the alliance members.
In conclusion, different procedures do not always lead to different alliance positions.
However, in most cases they do. If, in particular, the ideal positions of the firms are
acceptable to all alliance members, the different procedures lead to the same result. Also,
if first movers in a procedure have ideal positions which are mutually acceptable, the
procedure in which a late-mover outlier joins them does not play a role. Both these
situations will not be very common in business reality: usually alliance members have
their differences and need to negotiate firmly to overcome those differences. Therefore,
we can realistically say that, except for some special and rare conditions, the procedures
lead to different alliance positions.
6.2 Is being a first mover always advantageous?
In the example of the previous section, we saw that each firm preferred the step-by-step
procedure in which it joins first (first mover) over a simultaneous alliance over a step-
by-step alliance in which the firm joins last (late mover). This seems an intuitive result,
but does it always hold? Or, is it also possible that the following holds x{{i2,i3},i1} %i1
x{i1,i2,i3} %i1 x{{i1,i2},i3}? In other words, (1) can a situation occur in which a firm favors
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alliance formation such that it joins two partners which have already agreed together
on an alliance (i.e. being a last mover)? At first sight this seems a disadvantageous
situation: joining later in the process means coping with a strong block which already
has an agreement. And, (2) is it possible that a firm prefers to negotiate simultaneously
over being a first mover in a step-by-step approach? If firms want to keep control over
negotiations, this also seems counter-intuitive: bargaining in a large group is more difficult
as more compromises have to be made in order to reach consensus with all partners. In
order to study those two questions, we present a counter-example.
Example 1 Let us again consider forming a three-partner alliance N = {1, 2, 3}. This
is a one-dimensional example, that is, there is only one issue the three firms will have
to agree on. The ideal alliance positions perceived by the firms and the radii are as
follows: x∗1 = 0, x
∗
2 = −3, x∗3 = 3, r1 = 2, r2 = r3 = 4. Hence, the maneuvering spaces
here are equal to the following intervals: M1 = [−2, 2], M2 = [−7, 1], M3 = [−1, 7], and
consequently, M1 ∩M2 = [−2, 1], M2 ∩M3 = M1 ∩M2 ∩M3 = [−1, 1]. We assume the
firms to be ‘equally strong’, that is w1 = w2 = w3 = 1. When applying the step-by-step
procedures and the simultaneous procedure we get the following results:
x{1,2}1 = x
∗
1 = 0, x
{1,2}
2 = −2, x{1,2} = −1
x{1,2,3}{1,2} = x{1,2} = −1, x{1,2,3}3 = 1, x{{1,2},3} = −
1
3
x{2,3}2 = −1, x{2,3}3 = 1, x{2,3} = 0 = x∗1
x{1,2,3}{2,3} = x
∗
1 = x
{1,2,3}
1 = 0, x{{2,3},1} = 0 = x
∗
1
x{1,2,3}1 = x
∗
1 = 0, x
{1,2,3}
2 = −1, x{1,2,3}3 = 1, x{1,2,3} = 0 = x∗1
Hence, we get:
d(x∗1, x{{1,2},3}) =
1
3
> 0 = d(x∗1, x{{2,3},1}) = d(x
∗
1, x{1,2,3})
which means that x{1,2,3} %1 x{{1,2},3} and x{{2,3},1} %1 x{{1,2},3}.
Let us now adjust the example by assuming that the first firm is much more powerful
than the others, let w1 = 8, w2 = w3 = 1. The remaining assumptions are the same as in
Example 1. Hence, we get:
d(x∗3, x{{1,2},3}) =
31
10
<
37
10
= d(x∗3, x{1,2,3})
which means that x{{1,2},3} %3 x{1,2,3}.
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To interpret the findings of this example, we see that in the original version of
the example, firm 1 prefers the simultaneous procedure over the step-by-step procedure
{{1, 2}, 3}. Here, we answer the second question posed at the beginning of this section.
According to this example, it is possible that a simultaneous procedure is preferred by
a firm over any of the step-by-step procedures. Moreover, we can also answer the first
question phrased at the beginning of this section; can a firm prefer being a late-mover?
Some counter-intuitive findings in the example shows that it is possible. Player 1 chooses
step-by-step procedure {{2, 3}, 1} in which it joins as the last over step-by-step procedure
{{1, 2}, 3} in which 1 is one of the first movers. Also in the adjusted example, firm 3 rather
joins in later: the step-by-step procedure in which 3 joins as last partner is preferred by
3 over the simultaneous procedure.
With this example, we have shown that preferences of firms over procedures might
not always be as straightforward as one expects. It is possible that a firm prefers being a
late mover over simultaneous formation over being a first-mover. It appears that in some
cases it might be worth to wait to enter alliance negotiations. As an explanation, one
may think of delaying entrance until the other partners have settled their disputes. For
instance, if the other alliance partners can reach a compromise close to the ideal position
of the firm in question, it might pay for this firm to enter later. In other instances, forming
the alliance with the whole group simultaneously is the wisest thing to do. This could be
the case, for example, if a firm is a first mover in a multi-partner alliance, first trying to
settle with a firm which is very ‘far’ from its ideal point. In that case, negotiating at once
with all members of the alliance could appear to be more advantageous. Together with
its close neighbors it could be able to put more weight in the game to pull the alliance
position away from the outlier.
6.3 When is one procedure more advantageous?
Next, we consider under which conditions one procedure is more attractive to a firm than
another. We will study the attractiveness of the procedures in two steps. First, we present
a general fact and second, we zoom in on three-partner alliances. For the three-partner
alliance case, we present two specific situations (Propositions 9 and 10) under which
players have preferences over procedures.
To start with, using equations (2), (3) and (4), we immediately get necessary and
sufficient conditions for the attractiveness of one procedure over another. Taking any
two procedures, labelled S and S, a firm will prefer procedure S over procedure S if the
alliance position predicted by procedure S is closer to the ideal position of the firm than
the alliance position predicted by procedure S. In a similar way, we can define equal
attractiveness and strict preference. Formally, the following fact holds:
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Fact 1 For any S ⊆ N , S, S ∈ PROC(S) ∪ {S}, i ∈ S
xS $i xS iff
m∑
l=1
(xSl − x∗il)2 ≤
m∑
l=1
(
x
Sl
− x∗il
)2
(35)
xS %i xS iff
m∑
l=1
(xSl − x∗il)2 <
m∑
l=1
(
x
Sl
− x∗il
)2
(36)
xS ∼i xS iff
m∑
l=1
(xSl − x∗il)2 =
m∑
l=1
(
x
Sl
− x∗il
)2
(37)
The presented model contains three important elements which determine the outcome
of a procedure: the weights of the involved firms, the radii of their maneuvering spaces,
and their ideal positions. To put it differently, it matters how much power the firms have,
how flexible the firms are, and what their ideal alliance ideas are. The last two elements
determine a related element which is important in the model: the configuration of po-
sitions of all firms in the game. What is essential then is how the alliance ideas of the
firms are related to one another. In order to determine which procedure is better in which
case, all these elements play a role. Predicting in which kind of situation e.g. a simulta-
neous procedure is always the best option implies finding specific combinations of these
elements. For a general case, finding such predictions for different procedures including
all elements involving n players and m dimensions is very technical and complicated.
However, as a second step to finding out when one procedure is better than the other,
we can provide some sufficient conditions on three-partner alliances under which a firm
prefers one procedure over another. In this way, we show how the conditions of Fact 1
look like in a specific situation. Consider the following two propositions (Proposition 9
and 10). Proposition 9 focusses on the choice between the simultaneous procedure and
being a late mover. The choice between the simultaneous procedure and being a first
mover is studied in Proposition 10.
Proposition 9 Let Mi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1), Mi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2) and Mi3 = Mi3(x
∗
i3 , ri3)
be three maneuvering spaces in Rm such that Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 += ∅, x∗i1 /∈ Mi2 ∪Mi3,
x∗i2 /∈Mi1 ∪Mi3, x∗i3 ∈Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3, and
wi1
wi2
=
ri1
ri2
. (38)
(1) If d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) ≤ ri3 and
m∑
l=1
(x∗i3l − x∗i1l)(x∗i3l − x∗i2l) ≥
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
(39)
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then
x{i1,i2,i3} %i3 x{{i1,i2},i3}. (40)
(2) If d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) > ri3 then x{i1,i2,i3} $i3 x{{i1,i2},i3}.
What does Proposition 9 literally say? It assumes the ideal position of one of the three
firms (labelled here as firm i3) belongs to the maneuvering spaces of all firms in question
(i.e. i1, i2 and i3), while the ideal positions of the remaining firms (firms i1 and i2) lie
outside the maneuvering spaces of the other firms. Condition (38) says that the ratio of
the weights of firms i1 and i2 is equal to the ratio of the radii of these firms.
According to part (1), if the position (x{i1,i2}) of alliance {i1, i2} belongs to the ma-
neuvering space of firm i3 and condition (39) is satisfied, then firm i3 strongly prefers the
simultaneous procedure to the step-by-step procedure in which firm i3 joins in the last
step. Condition (39) is a technical condition which says that a certain expression of the
ideal positions of all the three firms creates a value, which is not smaller than the value
of the analogous expression, in which we replace the ideal positions of firms i1 and i2 by
the negotiation positions of these firms.
Part (2) says that if the position of pre-alliance {i1, i2} lies outside the maneuvering
space of firm i3, then firm i3 weakly prefers the simultaneous procedure to the step-by-step
procedure in which i3 joins in the end.
To be more intuitive, let us explain this proposition more in detail. The proposition
holds under a specific situation. The first characteristic of this situation is that the ideal
alliance position of firm i3 is acceptable by firms i1 and i2, but the ideal alliance ideas
of i1 and i2 are not acceptable by the remaining two firms. Firm i3 will usually have to
move less than its fellow alliance members, as its ideal position is already acceptable to
them. Secondly, firms i1 and i2 have a certain balance in their degree of flexibility and
their power. If firm i1 is twice as powerful (powerless) as i2, this characteristic says that
firm i1 is also twice as flexible (non-flexible) as firm i2.
Now, firms i1 and i2 form a pre-alliance as a intermediate step in the step-by-step
procedure. Of course, firms i1 and i2 together will form a pre-alliance position they
will use in the remaining step of the procedure (negotiation with i3). Two scenarios are
possible. First, the position which i1 and i2 agree on (x{i1,i2}) is acceptable by firm i3.
In this first scenario, a certain technical condition should hold, which demands a specific
relation between the ideal positions and negotiation positions of the firms. If this technical
condition holds in the first scenario, then firm i3 rather forms the three-player alliance
with the simultaneous procedure than joins as last member in the step-by-step procedure.
The second scenario describes the situation in which the position the pre-alliance {i1, i2}
agrees on is not acceptable by i3. In that case, firm i3 is either indifferent between the
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step-by-step procedure with i3 as last member and the simultaneous procedure or firm i3
still prefers the simultaneous procedure.
What makes the difference between the two scenarios and the preferences of firm i3 in
it? In the second scenario, firm i3 does not strictly prefer the simultaneous procedure over
being the last mover, while firm i3 is rather strict in its preferences in the first scenario;
there the simultaneous procedure is always its most preferred procedure over the late
mover procedure. In the second scenario something is different which makes that firm
i3 ‘starts to like’ the last mover procedure more. In addition to the technical condition
needed in the first scenario, the two scenarios differ in the acceptability of the pre-alliance
position for i3. Whereas scenario one leads to a pre-alliance position acceptable for i3,
the pre-alliance position reached in the second scenario is not acceptable for i3. Hence,
in the second scenario, firm i1 and i2 need to move their pre-alliance position more to
reach i3. In the late mover procedure of scenario two, firm i3 is relatively better capable
of pulling the other two players towards its ideal alliance position than in scenario one.
It is exactly the relative distant pre-alliance position which makes this difference: pulling
is needed more.
The second proposition (Proposition 10) which is presented now, analyzes when being
a first mover is preferred over simultaneously forming an alliance.
Proposition 10 Let Mi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1), Mi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2) and Mi3 = Mi3(x
∗
i3 , ri3)
be three maneuvering spaces in Rm such that Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 += ∅, x∗i1 /∈ Mi2 ∪Mi3,
x∗i2 /∈Mi1 ∪Mi3, x∗i3 ∈Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3. Moreover, let d(x∗i2 , x{i1,i3}) ≤ ri2 and
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i1l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
≥ 0. (41)
Then
x{{i1,i3},i2} %i3 x{i1,i2,i3}. (42)
In words, Proposition 10 also concerns the situation in which the ideal position of firm i3
belongs to the maneuvering spaces of all three firms in question, while the ideal positions
of firms i1 and i2 lie outside the maneuvering spaces of the other firms. Moreover, we
assume that the position of alliance {i1, i3} belongs to the maneuvering space of firm i2.
Finally, we impose condition (41), which says that a certain expression involving the ideal
positions of i1, i3, and the negotiation positions of i1 and i2 has a non-negative value. If
all of this holds, than firm i3 strictly prefers the step-by-step procedure with i2 as last
mover over the simultaneous procedure.
In order to explain this further, let us study more in detail the situation under which
this proposition holds. Partly this situation is the same as the one we have seen in
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Proposition 9. The ideal alliance position of i3 is acceptable for i1 and i2, but the ideal
alliance positions of i1 and i2 are not acceptable by the other two firms. Note that the
second characteristic mentioned in Proposition 9 is not imposed in this proposition.
As said earlier, in this proposition, we focus on the choice between the simultaneous
procedure and the step-by-step procedure with being a first mover. We will again use the
perspective of firm i3.
Furthermore, two conditions are met in the proposition. First, the position of the
pre-alliance between firms i1 and i3 is acceptable for i2. The pre-alliance position is
close enough for i2 to be acceptable. So, although i2 does not accept the ideal alliance
position of i1, it does accept the position of the pre-alliance formed by i1 and i3. The
second condition demands a certain relation between the ideal positions and negotiation
positions of the firms, again a rather technical condition.
If the sketched situation and the two conditions hold, then firm i3 prefers the step-
by-step procedure in which it is involved in the first step (and i2 as last mover) over the
simultaneous procedure. The situation and conditions make that firm i3 now prefers being
a first mover over forming the alliance with all members simultaneously. Apparently, the
position i3 can reach with i1 makes i3’s status against i2 better than negotiating with i2
in the simultaneous procedure.
7 CONCLUSION
In this article, we have proposed a dynamic spatial alliance model with two different
procedures to reach a multi-partner alliance. We have shown several results: the procedure
of forming an alliance matters, when procedure does not matter and that late moving
in the alliance process might pay off. On a less general level, but for a three-partner
case, we have analyzed when which procedure is more advantageous for a firm: when
being a first mover is more attractive than forming the alliance simultaneously, and
when the simultaneous formation is better than being a late mover. Innovations of the
paper are to model flexibility of players in achieving a certain (alliance) position, as
opposed to the static fixation of positions of most spatial coalition models. Also, to
model two different procedures (simultaneous and step-by-step) enriches the literature,
as most studies neglect procedure or adopt one procedure. Moreover, through formalizing
alliance positions into a multi-dimensional space, we can achieve endogenous preference
formation for alliances, while preferences over alliances are often assumed exogenously.
With this formal model, some three-partner examples, and general results, we can
draw several conclusions. First, the procedure adopted for reaching a multi-partner al-
liance does matter: different procedures usually lead to different alliance positions. We
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can also answer the question when it does not matter. If alliance partners’ ideal posi-
tions are acceptable by all members of the alliance, the simultaneous procedure and all
step-by-step procedures yield the same alliance position. Also, if the ideal positions of
all firms except the last mover are acceptable by all alliance members, the simultaneous
procedure and the step-by-step procedures with the given last mover lead to the same
outcome.
Second, we conclude that it can be disadvantageous for a firm to be a first mover
in negotiations. Although one would expect that a firm can better pull the negotiations
towards its own ideas when involved in an early stage, it can happen that joining later
is a better strategy. Also, a simultaneous procedure can be more advantageous than a
step-by-step procedure.
As a third conclusion, several elements play a role in determining when which pro-
cedure is better: the power, the flexibility, the ideal alliance position of each player, and
an element related to these ones - the configuration of the positions. The combination
of those elements in a specific empirical situation determine what is the best procedure.
The best procedure for a firm is the procedure that yields an alliance position closest to
the firm’s ideal position. In a three-partner case, firm k, with its ideal position acceptable
to i and j, prefers the simultaneous procedure over being a late mover (1) if there is a
certain balance in the firms’ degree of flexibility and their power and (2) if the pre-alliance
position of i and j is acceptable to k. In the same situation, firm k prefers being a first
mover with i over the simultaneous procedure (1) if the pre-alliance position of i and k
is not acceptable to j.
The implications of these findings are relevant for the two fields of contributions we
have mentioned in the introduction: multi-partner alliance formation and formal coalition
research. Although the literature on multi-partner alliances (e.g. Das and Teng, 2002;
Doz et al., 2000) has acknowledged the complexity of multi-partner alliances as com-
pared to dyadic alliances, no study has paid attention to the different formation paths
of multi-partner alliance formation. As we saw with some examples in the introduction,
formations of such multi-partner constellations differ. By simplifying those differences to
two procedures, we have shown that procedure influences the result of alliance formation.
Therefore, it really pays for an alliance manager to carefully consider his or her strategic
options when entering an alliance. Next to this insight, we have contributed with our
model by filling the gap of a lack of a more formal approach. The model has shown that
it is capable of laying bare different procedures and the implications those have. More
use of formal models might lead to more of such ‘hidden’ insights.
Concerning the second field of application, it also holds that almost no coalition model
has so far taken the aspect of procedure into account. Either the models neglected the
procedure (Schofield, 1993), or only one specific procedure was considered (as e.g. in
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Grofman, 1982). Since it appears that the choice for a procedure is crucial for the result
of a (spatial) coalition model, we strongly encourage future research to take this into
account.
Although no empirical testing has been done in this paper, we do want to discuss
how one could perform empirical tests with the model. In a second and related paper, De
Ridder et al. (2006), more attention is paid to testing and making calculations with the
model. These calculations have been done with an algorithm developed and reported in
Sa´iz and Hendrix (2006). The algorithm calculates which alliances are feasible, what the
different procedures are for each feasible alliance, and to which alliance position these
procedure lead. As input for the model, three kinds of data are needed: ideal positions of
players, a weight and a radius for each player.
In the De Ridder et al. article, the field of application is political science and data
from Dutch elections have been used. The ideal positions are ideal policy positions and
have been derived from a data set with policy positions of Dutch political parties on 56
dimensions from 1998 and 2003 (Klingemann et al., 2006). The weights of the parties
have been determined by the number of seats each party had in Dutch parliament. Due
to the lack of empirical data on the radii of the maneuvering spaces, two different ways to
determine the radii have been used: a radius similar for each party and a radius different
for each party, randomly generated.
In a more business setting, the following kind of data could be used. The ideal positions
of firms could be determined by empirically gathering these positions, for example via
qualitative research. A more easy approach is to used secondary data, as annual reports,
websites, and patents. The weights of firms can be determined in several ways, depending
on the specific use of weight (see Section 2.1). Information on amount of employees
and profit is usually public, while using bargaining power as interpretation would need
additional empirical research. Finally, for the maneuvering space the same holds as in
political science. So, either a fixed or randomly generated radius can be used.
We want to end with some suggestions for further research. The main drawbacks of
the model can be explained by the focus we have aimed at: revealing the procedures
of alliance formation and its consequences. We have therefore not been able to deal
with other aspects of the model. The condition for an alliance to be able to form is for
example quite strong: overlapping maneuvering spaces. No solution has been offered in
the case that firms’ maneuvering spaces do not overlap. Also, more research should be
done on which procedure is the best option in a specific situation. Instead of looking
for mathematical proofs, we suggest computer simulations due to the complexity of the
problem under study. And finally, future research should test the model in a business
setting, as the analogous model of coalition formation has been tested using data from
Dutch politics.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS AND THEOREMS
First of all, we recall the parametric equation of a segment:
Definition 3 (Parametric equation of a segment)
Let xA = (xA1, ..., xAm) and xB = (xB1, ..., xBm) be two points in Rm. Then,
xAxB = {(x1, ..., xm) ∈ Rm | xk = t ·xAk+(1− t) ·xBk for k = 1, ...,m; t ∈ [0, 1]}, (43)
where xAxB denotes the segment between xA and xB.
In some calculations below, we need some inequalities well-known in the literature in
mathematics, that is, Buniakowski-Cauchy inequality:
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Theorem 1 (Buniakowski-Cauchy inequality)
Let (a1, ..., an) and (b1, ..., bn) be two sequences of n (arbitrary) numbers. Then, the fol-
lowing inequality holds:
n∑
i=1
ai · bi ≤
√√√√ n∑
i=1
a2i ·
√√√√ n∑
i=1
b2i (44)
Definition 4 A convex set A is a bounded and closed set such that if a and b are any
two points belonging to A, then all points of the segment ab also belong to A.
Theorem 2 If A is a closed and bounded set and f is continuous in A, then there
exist points in A where f has its minimum and there exist points in A where f has its
maximum.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) We have to show that for each i ∈ S
m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − xSp)2 ≤ r2i . (45)
Since x˜Sj ∈
⋂
i∈S Mi for each j ∈ S, we have for each i, j ∈ S
m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − x˜Sjp)2 ≤ r2i . (46)
For each i, j, k ∈ S, by virtue of Buniakowski-Cauchy inequality for the sequences
(x∗i1 − x˜Sj1, ..., x∗im − x˜Sjm) and (x∗i1 − x˜Sk1, ..., x∗im − x˜Skm), we have
m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − x˜Sjp) · (x∗ip − x˜Skp) ≤
√√√√ m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − x˜Sjp)2 ·
√√√√ m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − x˜Skp)2. (47)
Hence, from (12), (46) and (47) we get for an arbitrary i ∈ S
m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − xSp)2 =
m∑
p=1
(
x∗ip −
∑
j∈S wj · x˜Sjp∑
j∈S wj
)2
=
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=
∑m
p=1
[∑
j∈S wj · (x∗ip − x˜Sjp)
]2
(∑
j∈S wj
)2 =
∑m
p=1
[∑
j∈S w
2
j · (x∗ip − x˜Sjp)2
]
(∑
j∈S wj
)2 +
+
2
∑m
p=1
[∑
j,k∈S,j %=k wj · wk · (x∗ip − x˜Sjp) · (x∗ip − x˜Skp)
]
(∑
j∈S wj
)2 =
=
∑
j∈S
[
w2j ·
∑m
p=1(x
∗
ip − x˜Sjp)2
]
(∑
j∈S wj
)2 +
+
2
∑
j,k∈S,j %=k
[
wj · wk ·
∑m
p=1(x
∗
ip − x˜Sjp) · (x∗ip − x˜Skp)
]
(∑
j∈S wj
)2 ≤ ∑j∈S w2j · r2i(∑
j∈S wj
)2+
+
2(∑
j∈S wj
)2 · ∑
j,k∈S,j %=k
wj · wk ·
√√√√ m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − x˜Sjp)2 ·
√√√√ m∑
p=1
(x∗ip − x˜Skp)2
≤
∑
j∈S w
2
j · r2i + 2
∑
j,k∈S,j %=k wj · wk · r2i(∑
j∈S wj
)2 =
=
r2i ·
[∑
j∈S w
2
j + 2
∑
j,k∈S,j %=k wj · wk
]
(∑
j∈S wj
)2 = r2i
Hence, we have proven (45). 2unionsq
(b) Let S ⊆ N and Mp(x∗p, rp), for p ∈ S, be maneuvering spaces in Rm such that⋂
p∈S Mp += ∅. Let us consider an arbitrary S such that |S| = 2, say S = {i, j}. Let us
consider an arbitrary y ∈Mi ∩Mj such that y ∈ x˜{i,j}i x˜{i,j}j . Hence, d(x∗i , y) + d(x∗j , y) =
d(x∗i , x
∗
j). First, we will show that y is Pareto efficient with respect to {i, j}. Suppose that
y is not Pareto efficient with respect to {i, j}. From definition (9) this means that there
exists z ∈Mi∩Mj such that z %i y and z %j y. Hence, by virtue of (3), d(x∗i , z) < d(x∗i , y)
and d(x∗j , z) < d(x
∗
j , y), and therefore d(x
∗
i , z) + d(x
∗
j , z) < d(x
∗
i , x
∗
j). But this gives a
contradiction, since d(x∗i , z) + d(x
∗
j , z) = d(x
∗
i , x
∗
j) if z ∈ x∗ix∗j , and d(x∗i , z) + d(x∗j , z) >
d(x∗i , x
∗
j) (triangle inequality) if z /∈ x∗ix∗j .
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x{i,j} lies on the segment x˜
{i,j}
i x˜
{i,j}
j , and therefore x{i,j} is Pareto efficient with respect
to {i, j}.
Let us consider an arbitrary S such that |S| ≥ 3. If all x˜∗p for p ∈ S lie on one segment,
the proof that xS is Pareto efficient is analogous to the case mentioned above. If not all
x˜∗p for p ∈ S lie on one segment, then the proof that xS is Pareto efficient is the following.
Since not all x˜∗p for p ∈ S lie on one segment, there are three parties i, j, k ∈ S such
that x∗i , x
∗
j and x
∗
k do not lie on one segment. Consider a plane containing x
∗
i , x
∗
j and
x∗k. Create segments xSx
∗
i , xSx
∗
j , and xSx
∗
k, and lines perpendicular to these segments.
The lines form a triangle, let us call it, the triangle ABC, where A, B, and C are the
intersection points of the lines containing x∗i and x
∗
j (point A), x
∗
i and x
∗
k (point B), and
x∗j and x
∗
k (point C), respectively. Let |AB|, |AC| and |BC| denote the lengths of the
sides of the triangle ABC. The area of the triangle ABC, denoted by |ABC| is equal to
|ABC| = d(x
∗
i , xS) · |AB|
2
+
d(x∗j , xS) · |AC|
2
+
d(x∗k, xS) · |BC|
2
. (48)
Suppose xS is not Pareto efficient with respect to S. This means that there is y ∈
⋂
p∈S Mp
such that for each r ∈ S, y %r xS, that is, for each r ∈ S, d(x∗r, y) < d(x∗r, xS). Hence, we
have,
d(x∗i , y) < d(x
∗
i , xS), d(x
∗
j , y) < d(x
∗
j , xS), d(x
∗
k, y) < d(x
∗
k, xS). (49)
Let hAB, hAC and hBC be the lengths of the heights starting in y and perpendicular to
AB, AC, and BC, respectively. Hence, we can write
|ABC| = hAB · |AB|
2
+
hAC · |AC|
2
+
hBC · |BC|
2
. (50)
Note that, of course,
hAB ≤ d(x∗i , y), hAC ≤ d(x∗j , y), hBC ≤ d(x∗k, y), (51)
and therefore, together with (49), we get
hAB < d(x
∗
i , xS), hAC < d(x
∗
j , xS), hBC < d(x
∗
k, xS). (52)
Applying (52) to (50), we have
|ABC| < d(x
∗
i , xS) · |AB|
2
+
d(x∗j , xS) · |AC|
2
+
d(x∗k, xS) · |BC|
2
, (53)
which gives contradiction with (48). Hence, there is no y ∈ ⋂p∈S Mp such that for each
r ∈ S, y %r xS, which means that xS is Pareto efficient with respect to S. 2unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 2
Let S ⊆ N and Mi = Mi(x∗i , ri), for i ∈ S, be maneuvering spaces in Rm such that⋂
i∈S Mi += ∅. First of all, note that
⋂
i∈S Mi is convex as an intersection of convex sets
Mi, i ∈ S.
The proof of the well-known fact that the intersection of an arbitrary number of
convex sets is convex is very straightforward. Let us take two arbitrary positions y and z
such that y ∈ ⋂i∈S Mi and z ∈ ⋂i∈S Mi. Hence, y ∈Mi and z ∈Mi for each i ∈ S. Since
Mi is convex (as a ball) for each i ∈ S, we have yz ∈Mi for each i ∈ S, where yz denotes
the segment between y and z. But hence yz ∈ ⋂i∈S Mi, this also means that ⋂i∈S Mi is
convex.
Note that d(x∗i , y) is continuous on the convex set
⋂
k∈S Mk. Hence, by virtue of
Theorem 2, there is at least one position in
⋂
k∈S Mk in which d(x
∗
i , y) has its minimum,
that is there is at least one solution of (11). Suppose that for a certain i ∈ S there are
two positions x˜Si ∈
⋂
k∈S Mk and y˜
S
i ∈
⋂
k∈S Mk satisfying (11). Hence,
d(x∗i , x˜
S
i ) = d(x
∗
i , y˜
S
i ) = min
y∈⋂k∈S Mk d(x
∗
i , y). (54)
Take a plane containing the positions x∗i , x˜
S
i and y˜
S
i . In this plane, the positions x
∗
i , x˜
S
i
and y˜Si create a triangle with sides of lengths d(x
∗
i , x˜
S
i ) = d(x
∗
i , y˜
S
i ) and |x˜Si y˜Si |. Of course,
since
⋂
k∈S Mk is convex, x˜
S
i y˜
S
i ∈
⋂
k∈S Mk. Let us create the height of the triangle which
is a segment between the apex x∗i and a certain point z˜ ∈ x˜Si y˜Si , perpendicular to x˜Si y˜Si .
Since
⋂
k∈S Mk is convex, in particular z˜ ∈
⋂
k∈S Mk. But this means that
d(x∗i , z˜) < d(x
∗
i , x˜
S
i ) = d(x
∗
i , y˜
S
i ),
which together with (54) gives a contradiction
d(x∗, z˜) < min
y∈⋂k∈S Mk d(x
∗
i , y).
2unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Let Mi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1) and Mi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2) be two maneuvering spaces in R
m such
that Mi1 ∩Mi2 += ∅. If ri2 ≥ d(x∗i1 , x∗i2), then by virtue of (5), x∗i1 ∈Mi2 , and therefore
min
z∈Mi1∩Mi2
d(x∗i1 , z) = d(x
∗
i1 , x
∗
i1) = 0.
Hence, x˜{i1,i2}i1 = x
∗
i1 . Suppose now that ri2 < d(x
∗
i1 , x
∗
i2). In order to find x˜
{i1,i2}
i1 , we have
to solve the following set of m+ 1 equations:{ ∑m
p=1(x˜
{i1,i2}
i1p − x∗i2p)2 = r2i2
x˜{i1,i2}i1p = t · x∗i1p + (1− t) · x∗i2p for p = 1, ...,m
(55)
with m+ 1 unknown quantities x˜{i1,i2}i11 , ..., x˜
{i1,i2}
i1m , t, where t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, we get
m∑
p=1
(t · x∗i1p − t · x∗i2p)2 = r2i2 .
Since 0 ≤ ri2 < d(x∗i1 , x∗i2), we have d(x∗i1 , x∗i2) > 0, and therefore, we can write equivalently
t =
ri2√∑m
p=1(x
∗
i1p − x∗i2p)2
=
ri2
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
. (56)
Applying (56) to (55), we get (25), because for each p = 1, ...,m
x˜{i1,i2}i1p =
ri2
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
· x∗i1p + x∗i2p −
ri2
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
· x∗i2p = x∗i2p +
ri2 · (x∗i1p − x∗i2p)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
.
2unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6
LetMi1 = Mi1(x
∗
i1 , ri1) andMi2 = Mi2(x
∗
i2 , ri2) be such thatMi1∩Mi2 += ∅. IfMi1∩Mi2 =
{y}, then x˜{i1,i2}i1 x˜{i1,i2}i2 = {y} and (10) is satisfied, which means that y is Pareto efficient.
Suppose that Mi1 ∩Mi2 contains more than one element. Let us take an arbitrary y ∈
Mi1 ∩Mi2 such that y ∈ x˜{i1,i2}i1 x˜{i1,i2}i2 . Hence, from the proof of Proposition 1(b), we have
that y is Pareto efficient.
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Let us consider now an arbitrary y ∈ Mi1 ∩ Mi2 such that y /∈ x˜{i1,i2}i1 x˜{i1,i2}i2 . Hence,
y /∈ x∗i1x∗i2 . It holds d(x∗i1 , y) + d(x∗i2 , y) > d(x∗i1 , x∗i2) (triangle inequality). We create two
balls Hi1(x
∗
i1 , d(x
∗
i1 , y)) ⊆Mi1 (the ball with the middle point x∗i1 and the radius d(x∗i1 , y))
and Hi2(x
∗
i2 , d(x
∗
i2 , y)) ⊆Mi2 (the ball with the middle point x∗i2 and the radius d(x∗i2 , y)).
Note that |Hi1 ∩ Hi2| > 1. Moreover, there is always z ∈ Hi1 ∩ Hi2 ⊆ Mi1 ∩Mi2 such
that d(x∗i1 , z) + d(x
∗
i2 , z) = d(x
∗
i1 , x
∗
i2), d(x
∗
i1 , z) < d(x
∗
i1 , y) and d(x
∗
i2 , z) < d(x
∗
i2 , y). But
this means, by virtue of (3), that z %i1 y and z %i2 y. Hence, from (9), y is not Pareto
efficient with respect to {i1, i2}.
2unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 8
(1) Let S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, ⋂j∈S Mj += ∅, and for each i ∈ S, x∗i ∈ ⋂j∈S Mj. Hence, by
virtue of (11), x˜Si = x
∗
i for each i ∈ S, and therefore by virtue of (12), we have for each
l = 1, ...,m
xSl =
∑
i∈S wi · x˜Sil∑
i∈S wi
=
∑
i∈S wi · x∗il∑
i∈S wi
. (57)
Take an arbitrary S = {{...{{i1, i2}, i3}...}, i|S|} ∈ PROC(S). First, we consider an
alliance {i1, i2}. Since each i ∈ S, x∗i ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, we have from (16),
x˜{i1,i2}i1 = x
∗
i1 , x˜
{i1,i2}
i2 = x
∗
i2
and from (18), for each l = 1, ...,m
x{i1,i2}l =
wi1 · x˜{i1,i2}i1l + wi2 · x˜{i1,i2}i2l
wi1 + wi2
=
wi1 · x∗i1l + wi2 · x∗i2l
wi1 + wi2
.
Since
⋂
j∈S Mj is a convex set, and x
∗
i1 , x
∗
i2 ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, also x{i1,i2} ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj. Hence, by
virtue of (20), x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} = x{i1,i2}. Moreover, x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3 = x
∗
i3 . We have then from (21), for
each l = 1, ...,m
x{{i1,i2},i3}l =
(wi1 + wi2) · x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2}l + wi3 · x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
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=
(wi1 + wi2) · x{i1,i2}l + wi3 · x∗i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
=
wi1 · x∗i1l + wi2 · x∗i2l + wi3 · x∗i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
Next we will show that for each alliance Sp, where 3 ≤ p < |S|, if for l = 1, ...,m
xSpl =
∑p
r=1wir · x∗irl∑p
r=1wir
(58)
then
x{Sp,ip+1}l =
∑p+1
r=1 wir · x∗irl∑p+1
r=1 wir
.
First of all, note that xSp ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, and therefore from (23), x˜
Sp∪{ip+1}
Sp
= xSp . Moreover,
since x∗ip+1 ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, we have from (22), x˜
Sp∪{ip+1}
ip+1 = x
∗
ip+1 . Hence, from (24) and (58),
we have for each l = 1, ...,m
x{Sp,ip+1}l =
x˜
Sp∪{ip+1}
Spl
·∑pr=1wir + x˜Sp∪{ip+1}ip+1l · wip+1∑p+1
r=1 wir
=
∑p+1
r=1 wir · x∗irl∑p+1
r=1 wir
.
If we take p = |S|−1, that is, an alliance Sp = S \{i|S|}, then we get for each l = 1, ...,m,
xSl =
∑
i∈S wi · x∗il∑
i∈S wi
= xSl.
2unionsq
(2) Let S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, ⋂j∈S∪{˜i}Mj += ∅, and for each i ∈ S, x∗i ∈ ⋂j∈S Mj. Let
i˜ ∈ N \ S. Take arbitrary S, S ∈ PROC(S). By virtue of (32), xS = xS and xS = xS.
Moreover, from (57), for each l = 1, ...,m
xSl =
∑
i∈S wi · x∗il∑
i∈S wi
.
Since xS, xS ∈
⋂
j∈S Mj, from (23), we have
x˜S∪{˜i}
S
= xS = xS, x˜
S∪{˜i}
S
= x
S
= xS. (59)
Hence, by virtue of (24) and (59), for each l = 1, ...,m, we have
x{S,˜i}l =
x˜S∪{˜i}
Sl
·∑i∈S wi + x˜S∪{˜i}i˜l · wi˜∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi
=
∑
i∈S wi · x∗il + wi˜ · x˜S∪{˜i}i˜l∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi
(60)
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x{S,˜i}l =
x˜S∪{˜i}
Sl
·∑i∈S wi + x˜S∪{˜i}i˜l · wi˜∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi
=
∑
i∈S wi · x∗il + wi˜ · x˜S∪{˜i}i˜l∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi
,
and therefore x{S,˜i} = x{S,˜i}. 2unionsq
(3) Let S ⊆ N , |S| ≥ 2, ⋂j∈S∪{˜i}Mj += ∅, i˜ ∈ N \ S, and for each i ∈ S,
x∗i ∈
⋂
j∈S∪{˜i}Mj. Take an arbitrary S ∈ PROC(S). From (11), x˜S∪{˜i}i = x∗i for each
i ∈ S, and therefore by virtue of (12) and (60), we have for each l = 1, ...,m
xS∪{˜i}l =
∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi · x˜S∪{˜i}il∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi
=
∑
i∈S wi · x∗il + wi˜ · x˜S∪{˜i}i˜l∑
i∈S∪{˜i}wi
= x{S,˜i}l.
2unionsq
Proof of Fact 1
Let S ⊆ N . Take arbitrary S, S ∈ PROC(S) ∪ {S} and i ∈ S. By virtue of (2), (3) and
(4), and taking into account that distances are non-negative, we have respectively
xS $i xS ⇔ d(xS, x∗i ) ≤ d(xS, x∗i ) ⇔ d2(xS, x∗i ) ≤ d2(xS, x∗i )
⇔
m∑
l=1
(xSl − x∗il)2 ≤
m∑
l=1
(
x
Sl
− x∗il
)2
xS %i xS ⇔ d(xS, x∗i ) < d(xS, x∗i ) ⇔
m∑
l=1
(xSl − x∗il)2 <
m∑
l=1
(
x
Sl
− x∗il
)2
xS ∼i xS ⇔ d(xS, x∗i ) = d(xS, x∗i ) ⇔
m∑
l=1
(xSl − x∗il)2 =
m∑
l=1
(
x
Sl
− x∗il
)2
2unionsq
Proof of Proposition 9
(1) Let Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 += ∅, x∗i1 /∈Mi2 ∪Mi3 , x∗i2 /∈Mi1 ∪Mi3 , x∗i3 ∈Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 ,
wi1
wi2
=
ri1
ri2
, d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) ≤ ri3
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m∑
l=1
(
x∗i2l − x∗i3l
) (
x∗i1l − x∗i3l
) ≥ m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
.
Note that x˜{i1,i2,i3}i3 = x
∗
i3 , d(x
∗
i3 , x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i1 ) = ri3 , d(x
∗
i3 , x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i2 ) = ri3 . We have for each
l = 1, ...,m
x{i1,i2,i3}l =
wi1 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l + wi2 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l + wi3 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
=
wi1 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l + wi2 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l + wi3 · x∗i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
and hence
d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2,i3}) =
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l −
wi1 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l + wi2 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l + wi3 · x∗i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
)2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
m∑
l=1
[
wi1 ·
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)
+ wi2 ·
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[w2i1 · d2(x∗i3 , x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1 ) + w2i2 · d2(x∗i3 , x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2 )+
2wi1wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
]
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
.
Since wi1 · ri2 = wi2 · ri1 , for each l = 1, ...,m
x{i1,i2}l =
wi1 · x˜{i1,i2}i1l + wi2 · x˜{i1,i2}i2l
wi1 + wi2
=
wi1
wi1 + wi2
[
x∗i2l +
ri2 · (x∗i1l − x∗i2l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
]
+
wi2
wi1 + wi2
[
x∗i1l +
ri1 · (x∗i2l − x∗i1l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
]
=
1
wi1 + wi2
[
wi1 · x∗i2l + wi2 · x∗i1l +
(wi1 · ri2 − wi2 · ri1)(x∗i1l − x∗i2l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i2)
]
=
wi1 · x∗i2l + wi2 · x∗i1l
wi1 + wi2
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If d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) ≤ ri3 , then x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2} = x{i1,i2}. For each l = 1, ...,m we have
x{{i1,i2},i3}l =
(wi1 + wi2) · x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2}l + wi3 · x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
=
wi1 · x∗i2l + wi2 · x∗i1l + wi3 · x∗i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
and therefore, from (39) and d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i3) > ri3 , d(x
∗
i2 , x
∗
i3) > ri3 , we have
d2(x∗i3 , x{{i1,i2},i3}) =
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
m∑
l=1
[
wi1 · (x∗i2l − x∗i3l) + wi2 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
]2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
w2i1 · d2(x∗i2 , x∗i3) + w2i2 · d2(x∗i1 , x∗i3) + 2wi1 · wi2
m∑
l=1
(x∗i2l − x∗i3l)(x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
]
>
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
= d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2,i3})
This means that x{i1,i2,i3} %i3 x{{i1,i2},i3}. 2unionsq
(2) Let Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 += ∅, x∗i1 /∈Mi2 ∪Mi3 , x∗i2 /∈Mi1 ∪Mi3 , x∗i3 ∈Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 ,
wi1
wi2
=
ri1
ri2
, d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) > ri3 .
As in part (1), we have
d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2,i3}) =
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
,
and for each l = 1, ...,m
x{i1,i2}l =
wi1 · x∗i2l + wi2 · x∗i1l
wi1 + wi2
.
d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) =
m∑
l=1
(
wi1 · x∗i2l + wi2 · x∗i1l
wi1 + wi2
− x∗i3l
)2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2)2
m∑
l=1
[
wi1 · (x∗i2l − x∗i3l) + wi2 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
]2
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=
1
(wi1 + wi2)2
[
w2i1 · d2(x∗i2 , x∗i3) + w2i2 · d2(x∗i1 , x∗i3) + 2wi1 · wi2 ·
m∑
l=1
(x∗i2l − x∗i3l)(x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
]
If d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2}) > ri3 , then for each l = 1, ...,m
x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2}l = x
∗
i3l +
ri3 · (x{i1,i2}l − x∗i3l)
d(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2})
= x∗i3l +
ri3 · [wi1 · (x∗i2l − x∗i3l) + wi2 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)]√
w2i1 · d2(x∗i2 , x∗i3) + w2i2 · d2(x∗i1 , x∗i3) + 2wi1 · wi2 ·
∑m
l=1(x
∗
i2l
− x∗i3l)(x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
Since x{i1,i2,i3}i3 = x
∗
i3 , for each l = 1, ...,m we have
x{{i1,i2},i3}l =
(wi1 + wi2) · x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i2}l + wi3 · x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i3l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
=
1
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
[(wi1+wi2+wi3)·x∗i3l+
(wi1 + wi2) · ri3 · [wi1 · (x∗i2l − x∗i3l) + wi2 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)]√
w2i1 · d2(x∗i2 , x∗i3) + w2i2 · d2(x∗i1 , x∗i3) + 2wi1 · wi2 ·
∑m
l=1(x
∗
i2l
− x∗i3l)(x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
]
and hence
d2(x∗i3 , x{{i1,i2},i3}) =
m∑
l=1
(x{{i1,i2},i3}l − x∗i3l)2 =
(wi1 + wi2)
2 · r2i3
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2 · r2i3
]
By virtue of the Buniakowski-Cauchy inequality we have
d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2,i3}) =
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
≤ 1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2 · d(x∗i3 , x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1 ) · d(x∗i3 , x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2 )
]
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2 · r2i3
]
= d2(x∗i3 , x{{i1,i2},i3})
which means that x{i1,i2,i3} $i3 x{{i1,i2},i3}. 2unionsq
43
Proof of Proposition 10
Let Mi1 ∩ Mi2 ∩ Mi3 += ∅, x∗i1 /∈ Mi2 ∪ Mi3 , x∗i2 /∈ Mi1 ∪ Mi3 , x∗i3 ∈ Mi1 ∩ Mi2 ∩ Mi3 ,
d(x∗i2 , x{i1,i3}) ≤ ri2 and
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i1l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
≥ 0.
From the proof of Proposition 9, we know that
d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2,i3}) =
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
.
Since x∗i3 ∈Mi1 ∩Mi2 ∩Mi3 and x∗i1 /∈Mi2 ∪Mi3 , we have x˜{i1,i3}i3 = x∗i3 , d(x∗i1 , x∗i3) > ri3 ,
for each l = 1, ...,m
x˜{i1,i3}i1l = x
∗
i3l +
ri3 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i3)
and for each l = 1, ...,m
x{i1,i3}l =
wi1 · x˜{i1,i3}i1l + wi3 · x˜{i1,i3}i3l
wi1 + wi3
=
1
wi1 + wi3
[
(wi1 + wi3) · x∗i3l +
ri3 · wi1 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i3)
]
.
If d(x∗i2 , x{i1,i3}) ≤ ri2 , then x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i3} = x{i1,i3}. Hence, for each l = 1, ...,m we have
x{{i1,i3},i2}l =
(wi1 + wi3) · x˜{i1,i2,i3}{i1,i3}l + wi2 · x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i2l
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
=
1
wi1 + wi2 + wi3
[
(wi1 + wi3) · x∗i3l +
ri3 · wi1 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i3)
+ wi2 · x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
]
Note that
ri3
d(x∗i1 ,x
∗
i3
) < 1, and d(x
∗
i3 , x˜
{i1,i2,i3}
i2 ) = ri3 . Moreover, note that for each l =
1, ...,m,
x∗i1l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l = x∗i1l − x∗i3l + x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
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and therefore
(x∗i1l−x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l )(x∗i3l−x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l ) = (x∗i1l−x∗i3l)(x∗i3l−x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l )+(x∗i3l−x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l )(x∗i3l−x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l )
Hence,
0 ≤
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i1l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
=
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i1l − x∗i3l
) (
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
+
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
which means that
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x∗i1l
) (
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
≤
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)
We have then
d2(x∗i3 , x{{i1,i3},i2}) =
m∑
l=1
(
x{{i1,i3},i2}l − x∗i3l
)2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
m∑
l=1
[
ri3 · wi1 · (x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i3)
+ wi2 ·
(
x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l − x∗i3l
)]2
=
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) +
2ri3 · wi1 · wi2
d(x∗i1 , x
∗
i3)
m∑
l=1
(x∗i1l − x∗i3l)
(
x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l − x∗i3l
)]
<
1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2
m∑
l=1
(x∗i3l − x∗i1l)
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
≤ 1
(wi1 + wi2 + wi3)2
[
r2i3 · (w2i1 + w2i2) + 2wi1 · wi2
m∑
l=1
(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i1l
)(
x∗i3l − x˜{i1,i2,i3}i2l
)]
= d2(x∗i3 , x{i1,i2,i3})
which means that x{{i1,i3},i2} %i3 x{i1,i2,i3}. 2unionsq
